BAILEY v. BERRY.

The "Burgh" Courts, which were formerly of considerable
importance, are now insignificant, their jurisdiction mainly consisting in the ognisance of trifling criminal causes.
T. W.ID.
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Superior Court of Cincinnati.
BAILEY v. BERRY ET AL.
Joint trespassers may be sued together, or any of them separately, and the non-

joinder of the others is no defence.
A release to one of several joint trespassers will discharge all; but it must be a
technical release, not merely a covenant not to sue, or other instrument amounting
to a release by implication merely.
Where plaintiff sued joint trespassers and then made an agreement with a portion of them to withdraw the suit as to them for a certain sum of money, and in
pursuance of this agreement made an entry on the record that he was unwilling
further to prosecute his action against the parties named, and as to them the action
was dismissed, held, that the others were not discharged, but they were entitled to
have the jury instructed, in making up their verdict to deduct the amount received
already by plaintiff frbm the amount of damages sustained by him.

THIS was a case reserved from Special Term upon the pleadings
and the evidence contained in the bill of exceptions.
In February 1860, the plaintiff filed his petition againstJ. Q.
A. Foster and fifteen other persons, for an alleged trespass upon
his property, in 0ampbell county, Ky., and in March, in the same
year, by leave, filed his amended petition, claiming damages for
the injury described in the former pleading.
Five of the defendatits, B. Taylor, Hallam, Piner, Root, and
Winston, filed demurrers to the petition, which, after argument,
were overruled.
On the 16th of June 1862, Charles Air answered with a general
denial of the allegations of the petition.
While the action was pending, an entry was made upon the
minutes by the plaintiff, that he would not further prosecute his
claim against four of the defendants, James Taylor, Jr., Barry
Taylor, John Taylor, and James R. Hallam, as to whom the action
was dismissed.
Subsequent to this, Berry, Winston, Root, and Air filed answers,
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to portions of which the plaintiff demurred, and his demurrer was
afterwards overruled. In March 1866,. the plaintiff, by leave,
filed an amended petition, in which he set forth that in October
1859, at Newport, Ky., he was the owner and in possession of
several printing presses, and divers articles attached to his printing establishment, including a large quantity of type, of the value
of ten thousand dollars, which the defendants had unlawfully taken
and converted to their own use, for which sum he asked judgment.
To this last amended petition the defendants Winston, Berry, Air,
and Root severally answered, denying the matters alleged against
them generally, and setting up, as a bar to the action against them,
"that since its commencement the plaintiff had, in consideration
of $1500, paid to him by J. R. Hallam, Barry Taylor, and James
Taylor, Jr., who were originally their co-defendants in the action,
settled, released, and discharged said defendants, from whom said
sum was received, from any and all liability for the wrong and
injury committed by them, and, as they were all joint trespassers,
the release of those parties discharged all the wrongdoers." To
this last allegation in their answer the plaintiff replies by a denial
of the whole statement.
On these pleadings the case was tried before a jury. The evidence, which is fully contained in the bill of exceptions, was submitted to the jury, and a verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiff
for $2556 against all the defendants remaining on the record.
To establish the fact of the release alleged in the answer, written and oral testimony was heard, which was uncontradicted, but
the effect of which, the judge, who tried the cause, held to be a
legal question only, and directed that a verdict should be rendered
upon the whole evidence offered to establish the plaintiff's right
to recover, as well as that of the defendants to oppose it, subject
however, to the opition of the court, on the law arising upon the
alleged release.
The defendants afterwards severally moved for a new trial.
&taloand Kittredge, for plaintiff.
Jordans and Jackon, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STORER, J.-The important question for us to consider, as the
counsel upon both sides admit, is, what was the effect of the entry

-
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by which four of the defendants were dismissed from the action;
does it apply only to those named, or does it extend to all the
defendants ?
The entry is, in substance, this: "The plaintiff comes and makes
to the court known that he is unwilling further to prosecute this
action against the parties described, and thereupon they are adjudged to go hence without day, and as to them the action is dismissed, at their proportion of the costs then accrued."
It cannot be claimed that this dismissal, which is equivalent
only to a judgment of nol. pros. at the common. law, can operate
either for or against the other defendants. No such effect would
be produced even in a criminal case. This was held in Bez v..
Sergeant, 12 Mod. 320, and is now the settled law.
We find in the early case of Parker v. Lawrence, decided in
the reign of James I., Hobart 70, that the court were of opinion
that a nol. pros. as to one or more joint trespassers, before judgment, would discharge the action. But in the next reign the case
just quoted was overruled, and the court held that a discontinuance as to one defendant was a mere agreement to relinquish the
action as to him only, and he alone could take advantage of it, the
plaintiff being still at liberty to proceed against the other defendants: Walsh v. Bishop, Cro. Car. 243.
Since this decision the current of the law has been uniform upon
the point. We find it settled in Yoke v. Ingam, 1 Wilson 90;
Dale v. Eyre, Id. 306; Oooper v. Tiffin, 3 T. R. 511; Mitchell
v. Mil6ank, 6 T. R. 200.

The cases are carefully collected and approved by Sergeant
Williams in his note to Salmon v. Sinith, 1 Saunders 206, note 2,
and establish fully the rule we have indicated, that a nol. pros. dismissal or discontinuance as to one defendant, before judgment,
does not enure to the benefit of the others. And thus it is when
an infant or a married woman are jointly sued-with another,'a
plaintiff may enter a nol. pros. as to the minor or the feme covert,
without affecting the liability of the other party to the suit: Pell
v. Pell, 20 Johns. 126; Woodward v. Newhall, 1 Pickering 500.
The principle which governs all these decisions implies that the
party injured by co-trespassers, or who is the creditor of co-debtors,
may sue either one of.the individuals against whom the action inay
be brought; he is not-bound to prosecute all, and, although a plea
in abatement is permitted in case of the non-joinder of debtors,
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the privilege does not extend to tort-feasors, all are regarded as
principals, and neither the omission to sue all, nor, if all are sued,
the dismissal of one of them from the suit, can be pleaded by the
other parties in bar.
From a very early period it has been held that the absolute
release of one joint trespasser from his liability, discharges all who
may have participated in the act; such is the language in Co. Litt.
section 376, and contemporaneous cases of Cooke v. Jenner, Hob.
66, and Hfitchcock v. Thornland, 3 Leonard 122. All united to
produce the injury, there was a common purpose to be accomplished
by the result, and there could be no severance of the liability.
Hence, if there was a remission of his liability to one, it became
the privilege of all. These decisions have since been followed by
the English and American courts, wherever the state of facts
warranted their application, and we need not refer to the numerous adjudications which have sustained the principle. In B11i8 v.
Bitzer, 2 Ohio 89, it is fully admitted.
But the release pleaded, as a discharge for all, that has been
given to one only, must be a technical release, under seal, expressly
stating the cause of action to be discharged, with all conditions or
exceptions: _F-tct v. Sutton, 5 East 232; Rowley v. Stoddard, 7
Johns. 207; .Dezeng v. Bai3I, 9 Wend. 886; Saw v. Pratt,22
Pick. 305; .Mason v. Jouetts' Adm'r., 2 Dana 107; Miller v.
Fenton, 11 Paige 18; Hoffman v. Dunlap, 1 Barb. 185; Crawford v. Xillspaugh, 13 Johns. 87 ; ASeymour v. Ainturn, 17. Id.
169; Couch.v. Mills, 21 Wend. 425; Jacki v. Stackhouse, 1
Cowen 122.
So strictly are these technicalities adhered to, that no release is
allowed by implication; it must be the immediate legal result of
the terms of the instrument which contains the stipulation; hence
it is that a covenant not to sue, or to assert a claim, or in any
manner to hold liable one joint debtor or trespasser, though it
operates between the immediate parties, does xot extend to the
others.
Thus, in the early case of Hitehcoec v. Thornland, already
referred to, where it was admitted- a release to one would discharge
all, the distinction we have stated was recognised by ATKINSo0,
J.; and in Lacy v. Kynaston, 1 Lord Raym. 689, reported also
in 12 Mod. 548, where the question came directly before the
judges, it was held that a covenant not to sue was personal to the
VOL. XVII.=-i 8
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covenantee only, and could not be set up by other parties. In
those -ases it was well observed, that such a covenant operated as
a release between the parties themselves, to avoid circuity of action,
but could not extend further, "as if A. and B. be jointly and severally bound to C. in a sum certain, and C. covenants with B. not
to sue him. That shall not be a release but a covenant only,
because he covenants only not to sue Bh, but does not covenant
not to sue A., against whom he still has his remedy." Late in the
last century the case of Dean v. Newhall, 8 T. R. 168, was determined by Lord KENY N, where the defendant -pleaded that his
principal, with whom he was jointly bound, having been, as he
claimed, released by an agreement under seal, which obligated
the plaintiff not to sue him, and if he did, the agreement thus
made "should be a sufficient release and discharge to all intents
and purposes, both at law and in equity to and for the debtor, his
executors, &c." It was argued that this agreement was aelease
of the:right of action against principal and surety, but,-in reply,
the case we have cited from Raymond was referred to, -and his
Lordship, in giving the opinion of the whole court, said: "The
case of Laay v. Kynaston removes all difficulty on this subject,
and is a direct authority for the plaintiff. I had only been doubting in my own mind on the strict law of the case, for that the honesty and justice of it are with the plaintiff, cannot be doubted.
Even if-the defendant had succeeded here, a Court of Equity
would have given the plaintiff full relief. But I am glad to find,
by the case cited, that we are fully warranted in deciding for the
plaintiff on legal grounds." Since the determination of this case,
there is not, we believe, a single reported decision, opposed to the
principle it affirms, to be found in the English Courts, and we
might quote cases ad libitum to the same point, if there could be
a doubt of the correctness of our statement: Farrellv. Forest, 2
Saund. 48, note 1.
In the American- courts the same rule is adhered to without
exception: lcLellan v. Dumberland Bank, 24 Maine 566;
AfcAllster .v. Sprague, 34 Id. 296; Walker v. MCullough, 4
Greenl. 421; Tuekerman v. Newhall, 17 Mass. 581; Shaw v.
Pratt,22 Pick. 305; Srmith v. Bartholomew, 1 Metc. 276; Brown
v. Marsh, 7 Vt. 327 ;- _Durell v. Wendell, 8 N. H. 369 ; Snow v.
Chandler,10 Id. 92; CraneAdm'r. v. Alling, 3 Green N. J.423;
Catskill Bank v. Ofessenger, 9 Cowen 38; Bowley v. Stoddard, 7
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Johns. 207; Couch v. 1Iills, 21 Wend. 424; Bronson v. Fitzhugh,
1 Hill 185; Trink v. Green, 5 Barb. 455.
The courts, in the examination of the numerous decided cases,
have been required to give a construction to every conceivable
stipulation inserted in the agreements which have been pleaded
as releases of liability, and have invariably pursued the same
course in yielding nothing to mere implication, wherever words
of release are found in the instrument. The intention of the
parties is alone regarded, holding the established legal maxim,
that where a particular purpose is to be accomplishea, and language which expresses it is clear and certain, no general words
subsequently used in the same agreement shall extend the meaning of the parties: Thorpe v. Thorpe, 1 Lord Raym. 285.
DALLAS, C. J., in Solly v. Forbes, 2 Brod. & Bing. 46, having
examined the leading cases, observes, as courts look at the intention of the parties, in modern times more than formerly, rather
than the strict letter, not suffering the latter to defeat the former,
held that general words of releasd'even, could not be operative to
enlarge a previous statement which defined the particular object
for which the agreement was made. The same principle is found
in Turpenny v. Young, 5 Dowl. & Ry. 262, and is referred to
and affirmed in Thompson v. Each, 8 M., G. & Scott 551. See
also .North v. Wakefield, 18 Ad. & E. 540.
On similar grounds, it was held, in McAllister v. Sprague, 84
Maine 297, where a receipt had been given by a creditor to one
of his joint debtors, which recited that the debtor had paid a certain sum in full of his half of the debt, due jointly by him and
another, and which was to be his discharge in full for debt and
costs, but no discharge of the co-debtor. It was decided that this
could not be pleaded as a release by the other judgment-debtor,
the intention of the parties being that his liability should still
remain. See also -Durellv. Wendell, 8 N. H. 369.
Having thus ascertained what is now the *established rule in
deciding the question raised by the defendant, let us now examine the facts, as they are found proved in the bill of exceptions,
and to which there is no contradiction.
Before we proceed, however, it is proper to consider how far
the entry on record, by which the defendants Taylor and Hallam
were dismissed from the suit, can be explained or enlarged by
parol evidence. The purpose is plainly stated, and as to the par-
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ties named therein, it was a legal discharge from the pending proceedings, but how far it was a bar to a subsequent action, is not
now a question, as counsel admit it would be barred by the statute.
As the only written evidence of an arrangement between the plaintiff and these parties, is the record made at the time, and without
which it would be difficult to say how these parties could avail
themselves-of the alleged benefit they had secured, it would seem
to be inconsistent with the established rule of evidence to permit
any explanation where there is neither ambiguity in the terms
used, or the purpose intended to be accomplished.
But to give the testimony its full weight, the result of a careful analysis of- the whole is this: During the pendency of this
suit, the counsel of both parties met the father (Col. Taylor) of
two of the then defendants, and with Hallam, another, the plaintiff. also being present, when it was agreed that fifteen hundred
dollars should be paid, and these defendants dismissed or released
from the action, reserving to the plaintiff his right to proceed
against the other defendants. The money was paid by Col. Taylor, and the entry referred to made accordingly.
If- then, we apply the doctrine already stated, where written
instruments, pleaded as releases, have been construed by the
courts,. we cannot perceive that the arrangement- made by the
plaintiff with the defendants, is without the rule.
To give it allthe weight to which it is justly entitled, it must
be determined upon the same principles which control every similar case, however formal may be the evidence to establish the
facts.
The result of our investigation has led us all to conclude that
neither the entry on the record dismissing three of the defendants
from the action, or the arrangement made with the parties, which
preceded that entry, and on which the agreement to dismiss was
founded, can be regarded as a discharge in law of the defendants
who still remain on the record.
First-Because they are not technical releases in writing sealed
by the proper party.
Second-That if they could be construed as implying an agreement not to sue, they can avail only to the defendants with whom
they were made, and cannot operate for the benefit of the defendants who set up the facts in discharge of the plaintiff's action
against them.
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Third-That the entry referred to dismisses the defendants
only from the action, without reference to their co-defendants.
It was the privilege of the plaintiff to have entered a nol. pros. or
discontinuance as to any one or more of the defendants, and the
dismissal in the case before us but produces the same result.
The plaintiff might have sued either of the defendants, or all,
and as it would be no ground of defence that other parties were
not joined, it must follow, the remaining defendants in the suit
have no cause of complaint.
Fourth-That the intention of the parties, as expressed when
the arrangement was made and proved by the witnesses, must be
taken to qualify the agreement, and thus establish its true character, and we believe it was merely to decline to prosecute further
the defendants who were dismissed, and nothing more.
Neither do the facts we have alluded to prove an accord and
satisfaction, as it must be admitted, if they did, it would have the
same effect as a technical release, nor do they contain the ordinary
elements of what the law regards as necessary to constitute such
a bar. We have been specially referred to the case of Ellis v.
Bitzer, already quoted to change or greatly modify the rule we
have stated, but it does not, we think, conflict with the leading
principle which we suppose governs all similar cases. The courts
do not there assume any new rule of interpretation, or attempt to
extend the operation of that which has hitherto been received, and
acted on in the trial of causes, and we find nothing inconsistent
therefore, with the conclusion to which we have arrived.
Nor do we doubt, although there may be found individual judgments against joint trespassers, the plaintiff can have but one
satisfaction; he must elect which of the judgments he will enforce,
on the same principle, where there may be different findings by
the same verdict when all the trespassers are sued, the successful party must choose "1de melioribus"damnis"-he cannot claim
to collect all. It follows, then if the damages are satisfied in
part, by payment, or compromise with some of the defendants,
the plaintiff may still proceed against those who remain on the
record, and we hold it was the duty of the judge who tried the
cause at Special Term, to have instructed the jury, as he did, to
deduct in their finding whatever sum the plaintiff has already
received on account of his alleged injuries, from the parties who.
were afterwards dismissed. This was the just application of the

BAILEY v. BERRY.

rule that there cannot be a double remuneration for the same
wrong.
This is very distinctly stated by Judge. UPHAM in "Snow v.
Chandler,10 N. H. 95. It is, he says, that "the 5um paid was not
received in satisfaction of the damages, but only in part satisfaction, and the fact that it was coupled with an engagement not to
sue, does not alter the case. But to the extent of the amount
paid, the defendant may a-vail himself of the arrangement." See
also Merchants' -Bank v. Curtis, 37 Barb. 820.
We have thus traced the principle, familiar as it is, that determines this case to its source, and followed down the course of decisions to the present time, not that there was any novelty in the rule,
but that we might satisfactorily determine what in reality was a
legal bar to this action, and although the examination of the
numerous cases, both -ancient and modern, has convincedus that
the old maxim, "i3felius est petere fontes, quam seetari rivulos,"
has not always been regarded by the courts, we find no difficulty
inarriving. at the result we have reached. Not only upon the law
as we hold it to be, but on the facts proved, we are all of opinion
that the motion for a new trial should be overruled, land judgment
entered on the verdict.
The foregoing opinion embodies the
law so thoroughly, and is upon a questionof so much practical importance, that
we are glad of an opportunity to present
it to the profession. The case turns
altogether upon the effect of the ,etraxit
or nol. pros. as to a portion of the defendants. The facts seem to be, that'
the plaintiff accepted $1500 of a portion
of the defendants, and discontinued the
suit against them, under an agreement
that they should be no further prose..'
cuted for the trespass, but that the plaintiff should be at liberty to proceed against
the other defendants. Upon this state of
facts the judge at the trial charged the
jury, that the transaction did not amount
to a bar of the action ; but that the
amount ieceived must be considered inmaking up the damages against the other
defendants. This seems to us both legal
and equitable. It is a creditable illus-

tration and application of the rule, that
it is the duty of courts so to construe the
contracts of parties as to effect their
intention, if practicable.
It was a mere question, to reduce it to
its simplest elements, whether what
pagsed between the plaintiff, and the defendants let out of the action, amounted
to a release of the cause of action, or a
covenant not to sue these defendants. If
the contract had been in writing, it
might have been so drawn, through ihe
inexperience of the draughtsmat, or
possibly thrdugh mere inattention, that
the court must of necessity treat it as a
release. If that is so, the court have no
alternative but to say the contract is so
defective as to render it impossible for
the court to carry into effect the intention of the parties. But so long as it
remains in oral evidence it is always
easy to escape so disastrous a result.
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We should always

The case may always be refbrred to the

the real purpose.

jury, and they wilrnever experience any

feel more or less compassion for any
judge who felt himself so effectually
hampered by forms as to be driven into
any such absurd consequence. The opinion seems to us creditable, both in form
and substance. And we rejoice at this
obvious tendency of modern commonlaw jurisprudence to reach obviously just

difficulty in finding that the parties used
such terms as, on the whole; to express
their obvious intent. And that, in the
present case, is entirely unquestionable.
It is as certain that the plaintiff did
not intend to release the cause of action,
as that he did intend no further to prosecute the defendants let out of the
action. There must, then, be very clear
proof of the use of terms, which do,
of necessity, release the cause of action,
to induce the court to give them that

effect, where there is not the slightest

results, which is the great excellence
of an unwritten system of law over one
that is cramped into written forms. The
one is temporal and imperfect, the other
eternal and complete, if wisely and
fairly administered.
I. F. R.

doubt, on the whole case such was, not

Circuit Court,of the United States. District of California.
GORDON v. SOUTH FORK CANAL COMPANY.
The rule that the title of a purchaser acquired under'a judicial sale will be held
good, though the judgment be afterwards reversed, applies to all purchasers,
whether parties to the suit or not.
By a decree of the Circuit Court, a claim was held to be a lien on an entire
canal. From this decree an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, pending
which the canal was sold under the decree, and the plaintiff in the decree became
the purchaser. The Supreme Court reversed the decree on the ground that the
claim was a lien on a section of the canal only. Held, that plaintiff's title under
the sale was not affected by the reversal.

COMPLAINANT filed a bill in the Circuit Court to enforce a claim
for work and materials used in the construction of certain sections
of defendants' canal. The court at June Term 1865, entered a
decree for complainant for $76,000, declaring it a lien on the
entire canal, which was ordered to be sold by a master. The sale
took place in November 1865 to the assigned of the decree, and
was duly confirmed by the court and a conveyance made by the
master. In October 1865, an appeal was taken to the Supreme
Court, but no bond filed for supersedeas or stay of proceedings.
In larch 1868, the Supreme Court reversed the decree so far as
it declared the claim a lien on the entire canal, adjudging the lien
to cover only the sections upon which plaintiff's work was done,
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and remanding the cause to the Circuit Court with directions to
enter a decree in conformity with itsopinion.
The defendants filed the mandate and asked not only obedience
to its commands but also that the sale made under the decree
reversed be set aside, and the property sold be restored to them.
The purchaser at the master's sale and his vendee appeared in
opposition to the latter application.
f.

Opinion by
FIELD, Circuit Judge.-Obedience to the mandate of the Supreme Court will always be rendered by this court, as is its duty.
It -will be a prompt and implicit obedience; but we trust it will
be, as it is intended it should be, an intelligent, not a blind obedience. The judgments of that tribunal are based upon the records
before it, and these judgments will be unhesitatingly enforced,
except as their enforcement may be modified or restrained by
events occurring subsequent to the period covered by the records.
That such events may modify, and often do modify, the mode and
manner of enforcement is well known to all members of the profession. The death of parties, partial satisfaction, changes of
interest subsequent to judgment, and sales upon the judgment
pending the appeal, are instances where this result is frequently
produced.
The decree which this court will enter under the mandate of
the Supreme Court will, like the previous decree, adjudge, as the
amount due, the- sum reported by the master; with interest; but
it will declare that it is a lien only upon that portion of the canal
which is embraced between sections 17 and 25 inclusive, which
were constructed by the complainant. Whether it will go further,
and order the enforcement of such lien by directing a sale of the
particular sections, will depend upon the effect of the reversal of
the decree upon the previous sale; and this brings us to the second
part of the defendants' motion.
There is some contradiction in the adjudged cases as to the effect
of the reversal of a judgment or decree upon rights acquired under
it. This contradiction has arisen principally, if not-entirely, from
not distinguishing between the effect of the reversal upon the
rights of the parties with respect to the subject-matter in controversy, and its effect upon rights acquired on proceedings taken
for its enforcement; and yet the difference in the operation of the
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reversal in the two cases is obvious, and need only be stated to be
recognised.
For instance, it is adjudged that the defendant is indebted to
the plaintiff in a certain sum of money, and that the plaintiff
recover the same. Here the operation of the judgment is to determine the fact of indebtedness, as well as to authorize the use of
the means provided by law for its collection. The reversal of the
judgment changes the entire relation of the parties; it recalls the
affirmation of indebtedness, and denies its existence. If such supposed indebtedness has been collected whilst the judgment remained in force, the reversal necessarily requires that restitution
should be made.
On the other hand, if whilst the judgment remains unreversed
proceedings are taken for its enforcement, and property of the
defendant is sold under them, the purchaser acquires a good title.
The judgment being valid, and its enforcement not being stayed,
all persons relying upon it are protected, for it is a general principle that a judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of
the parties and subject-matter, however erroneous, is, until reversed, as efficacious for all purposes as though approved by the
highest tribunal of the land. To the errors which the court may
have committed in its rendition, persons trusting to its protection
need pay no attention. Were it not so, the judgment would be
of no avail to the successful party until it has been approved by
the highest appellate tribunal, or until the time to appeal has
expired. The doctrine in this respect is well expressed in Gray
v. Brignardello, 1 Wall. 627. In that case it appeared that certain real property had been ordered sold by one of the District
Courts of California in a suit brought to settle up an alleged copartnership between certain parties, one of whom had died intestate. The court adjudged that a copartnership had existed
between the parties named, and that the real property in question
beldnged to such copartnership, and directed .its sale. The property was accordingly sold. Subsequently the Supreme Court
of the state reversed -the decree, holding that the alleged copartnership was not established by the proofs. The heirs of the
deceased party then brougut ejectment in the Circuit Court of the
United States for parcels of the property sold. In that court and
in the Supreme Court, where the case was subsequently carried,
it was contended by their counsel that the decree authorizing the
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sale having been reversed, the sale fell with it, but the court in
reply said: 1 It is a well-settled principle of law that the decree
or judgment of a court which has jurisdiction of the person and
subject-matter is binding until reversed, and cannot be collaterally
attacked. The court may have mistaken the law or misjudged
the facts, but its adjudication, when made, concludes all the world
until set aside by the proper appellate tribunal. And, although
the judgment or decree may be reversed, yet all rights acquired
at a judicial sale while the decree or judgment was in full force,
and which it authorized, will be protected. It is sufficient for the
buyer to know that the court had jurisdiction, and exercised it,
and that the order on the faith of which he purchased was made,
and authorized the sale. With the errors of the court he has no
concern."
But whilst this doctrine is admitted to be in general correct, it
was contended. on the argument that it applied only to strangers
to the judgment or decree, and did not extend to parties or their
privies. And expressions were cited from opinions of different
judges, to the effect that by the reversal the defendant or unsuccessful party in the court below is to be restored to all things
which he lost by the erroneous judgment or decree, and that protection is afforded to strangers at judicial sales in order to encourage bidding. Expressions of this kind may be very just and
appropriate in connection with -the particular facts of the special
cases in which they are used; but they do not express a rule
applicable in all'cases, or furnish the true reason for the protection extended to purchasers at judicial sales. 'The principle that
the defendant or unsuccessful party in the court below is to be
restored to all things which he lost by the erroneous judgment or
decree can not apply to those things the title of which may be
transferred by proceedings taken for -the enforcement of the judgment or decree when its enforcement is not stayed pending the
appeal. The restoration in specie in'such cases being impossible
without infraction of the principle by which judgments of courts
are upheld -and enforced, it follows that the right which the
reversal gives must be that of action to recover an equivalent for
the lost thing. And perhaps the rule may be stated thus: That
the defendant or unsiccessful party in the court below is to be
restored, by reversal, to all things which he lost by the erroneous
judgment or decree, if the title to them has not passed by the
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previous enforcement of the judgment or decree, and in such case
he is to have a right of action for a money equivalent. And the
rule as thus stated would leave the parties to take advantage of
the proceedings for the enforcement equally with third persons.
There is no reason why they should not have the same protection
extended to them as to strangers. The judgment or decree is
equally binding upon all, and should be equally efficacious for protection. When the judgment or decree directs a sale of property
of the defendant, it may be regarded as a power of attorney to
the officer charged with its execution created by the law, and, like
any other power, sufficient to give validity to the acts of the officer
until the power is revoked by the reversal. There is no prohibition in the law, or objection in the reason of the thing, against a
party taking advantage of the proceedings had for the enforcement
of the judgment which he has recovered. Strangers are protected,
not because a contrary rule would discourage bidding, but because
they have a right to rely upon the validity of the judgment and
invoke its protection for all acts done under it whilst it is in force,
and for the rights they have acquired thereby. That the rule
also has the effect of encouraging bidders at the sale is evidence
of its wisdom, but is not the reason of its establishment. In Parker's Heirs v. Anderson's Heirs, 5 T. B. Monroe 445, real property belonging to one Parker had been sold under a decree of a
court of equity which was subsequently reversed. At the sale
one Anderson became the purchaser, and after reversal, in a suit
brought by the heirs of Parker against the heirs of Anderson, the
court below refused to compel a surrender of the title of the property. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, where the case was
taken, held the ruling correct.
"The decree," said that court, "under which both the legal
and equitable title was derived, it is true has since been reversed
by the decision of this court; but neither from analogy to legal
proceedings, nor the principles and usages of equity, can the
reversal of the decree under which the lot was sold and the title
conveyed authorize a court of chancery to decree a reconveyance
of the title so obtained. The doctrine is well settled at law, that
estate sold under a writ of fierifaciaswill be retained by the purchaser, though the judgment upon which the execution issued may
be afterwards reversed ; and the rule is the same in equity, where
land is sold under the decree of a court of equity and the decree
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is afterwards reversed. After the reversal of a judgment at law,
or:
the decree of a court of equity, the person prejudiced by the
decree is entitled to the proceeds of the estate sold, either under
execution upon the judgment, or in obedience to the judgment, or
in obedience to the decree; and it would, no doubt, be competent
for a court of law or equity to compel restitution of the money for
which the estate sold. But both law and equity guard, with great
circumspection, the interest derived by purchasers under the processes of couris of law, or the decrees of courts of equity; and
unless there be unfairness in the transaction, the title which the
purchaser acquires, either by the sale of an officer acting under a
fierifacias at law, or the sale of a commissioner acting under the
decree of a court of equity, will never, upon the reversal of a
judgment or decree, be disturbed.
"The rule was, in argulnent, admitted to be, in the general,
correct; but it was attempted to limit its application to purchasers
who are neither parties nor privies to the judgment or decree
under which the sale is made. The reason for such a limitation
of the principle is not, however, perceived by us, and we have met
with no adjudged case, either at law or equity, wherein any such
exception to the rule has been made. The parties to a judgment
or decree are, equally with all others, at liberty to bid and purchase property exposed for sale under the authority of a judgment
or decree, and there is the same reason for protecting the interest
acquired by a party under a purchase as that of a stranger."
With the views thus forcibly expressed we fully concur.
The only case which at all conflicts with it to which we have been
referred, is that of .Bey!nolds v. Harrs, decided by the Supreme
Court of this state: 14 Cal. 667. The circumstances of that case
are peculiar. Separate parcels of real property, consisting of
mining canals and ditches, had been mortgaged by different parties to secure the same indebtedness. The decree of foreclosure
directed the sale of the property upon terms variant from those
prescribed by the statute, and in such a manner as to defeat the
right allowed by the law of the state of some of the mortgagees to
redeem the separate parcels mortgaged by them.
At the sale the mortgagee and complainant in the foreclosure
purchased the entire property-two of the parcels mortgaged
being struck off together upon one bid-and received the officer's
certificate of the sale-a certificate which would entitle him to a
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deed at the end of six months, if no redemption were made in the
meantime; but which redemption from the manner of sale was
impossible with reference to one of the parcels. The amount to
be paid to redeem the separate parcels could not be ascertained,
as they were sold together. The certificate of sale and the decree
were subsequently assigned to Harris. Afterwards the decree
was reversed so far as it directed the sale, and on petition of
defendants the sale was set aside, and the credit allowed for the
amount bid vacated.
It will be thus seen that the sale was not perfected when the
proceedings were set aside, and upon this fact, together with the
departure in the sale from the directions of the statute, the action
of the court may be sustained. But there is much in the opinion
which we think iequires qualification, but which, without qualification, we are satisfied, from the extended examination we have
given to the authorities, is uns'pported by any well-considered
adjudication. We find no case which draws the distinction there
taken between parties and strangers, and makes the upholding of
a judicial sale, after reversal of the judgment or decree under
which it was made, depend upon the character of the purchaser.
If now we test the question presented by the application before
us, we shall find it one of 'easy solution. This court, im rendering
its decree of September 1865, had jurisdiction of the parties and
of the subject-matter. It passed upon the amount of indebtedness
of the South Fork Canal Company to the complainant, upon the
existence of the lien asserted, and its extent. It adjudged that
the lien extended to the entire flume and canal, and it decreed the
sale of the property in case payment of the complainant's demand
was not made by a day designated. The payment was not made
and the sale took place, the master following in all particulars the
direction of the decree. His report of his proceedings was not
excepted to and was confirmed. The complainant was mentioned
in the decree as a possible bidder, and provision made for crediting his bid on the amount adjudged due to him. The master
reported that the assignee of the complainant, Hosmer, became
the purchaser, and when the report was confirmed the master was
directed to execute to him a deed of the property. If Hosmer
and his grantee cannot under these circumstances trust to the title
thus acquired, it is difficult to imagine any cas6 of judicial sale
which may not be vacated upon a subsequent reversal of the judg-
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ment or decree under which it is had. We are clear that the purchaser took a title to the premises which cannot be disturbed.
That part of the motion, therefore, which asked that the sale be set
aside, and the property sold restored to the defendants, is denied;
and the decree to be entered on the mandate of the Supreme
Court will contain the provisions already mentioned, without
directing the enforcement of the-lien upon the sections named.
The defendants are entitled to have the costs incurred by them
in the Supreme Court credited to the amount found by the master
as due the complainant.

Circuit Court of the United Sta'esfor the Southern District of
New York.
AUGUSTIN DALY v. HENRY D.PALMER

AND

HENRY 0.

JARRETT.
The term "dramatic composition" in the copyright acts includes all manner of
compositions in which the story is represented by dialogue or action instead of
narrative, and a scene or composition in which the author's ideas'are conveyed by
action alone, is within the term.
A dramatic scene or incident in which the ideas are expressed by action alone,
or by action and dialogue combined, is within the acts, and the copyright is
infringed by another scene in which the same dramatic effect is produced by the
same ideas in substantially the same order and arrangement, thcugh the characters
may be changed and the portions represent#A by action in one may be represented
by spoken words in the other.
Stage directions, and the order of representation of events in accordance therewith, are the subject of copyright.'
A piracy is committed if the meritorious part of the composition is incorporated
in another work without material alteration in the constituent parts or in the
sequence of events in the series. And the change of characters in a dramatic scene
from male to female, the transfer of the scene to an underground place of confinement, the use of different instruments of release, &c.; the chief ideas and their
sequence remaining the same, are not material alterations.
Where two- dramatic scenes are substantially alike, and the charge of plagitrisku
is made in a bill by the author of one to restrain infringement of copyright, and
not denied by defendant's answer, the validity of the copyright is not impaired by
showing that the incidents.of which the scene was composed were all known and
'We are indebted for this novel and interesting case to the courtesy of Judge
B] ATCHFORD.-EDS. AN. LAW REG.
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in common use before the complainant's play was composed , and that a story had
been previoubly published in which the incidents had been related in similar order.
The representation of a part of a play is an infringement of copyright.
The sale, with a view to public representation, of a play which infringes the
copyright of another, makes the seller a participant in causing the play to be publicly represented, and an injunction will be granted against the sale.

Tlomas S. Alexander and William Tracy, for the plaintiff.
William -D. Booth and T. W. Clarke, of Boston, for the defendants.
BLATCHFORD, J.-This is an application for a provisional injunction to restrain the defendants from the public performance and
representation, and from the sale for dramatic representation, of
a scene called the "railroad scene" in a play called "After Dark."
The plaintiff is by profession a dramatic author, his business being
to compose, write and produce on the theatrical stage dramatic
compositions, commonly called plays. The defendants are the
managers of a public place of theatrical amusement, in the city of
New York, called Niblo's Garden. Before the 1st of August
1867, the plaintiff composed and wrote a dramatic composition
called "Under the Gaslight," and on that day he took the proper
steps to secure to himself a copyright for the composition, under the
provisions of the Act of February 3d 1831 (4 U. S. Stat. at Large
436), by depositing before publication a printed copy of the title
of the composition as author and proprietor, in the Clerk's office
of the District Court of the Southern District of New York, where
he resided at the time. The composition was afterward printed
and published, and within three months from its publication he
caused a copy of it, as printed and published, to be delivered to
said clerk. He also gave information of copyright being secured
by causing to be printed and inserted in the several copies published the words prescribed by the fifth section of the act.
The Act of 1831 confers upon the author and proprietor of a
dramatic composition, duly copyrighted, the sole right and liberty
of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending such composition,
in whole or in part, for the term of twenty-eight years from
the time of recording the title of such composition, in the manner
directed by the act. The Act of August 18th 1856 (11 U. S. Stat.
at Large 138), provides that any copyright thereafter granted
under the laws of the United States "to the author or proprietor
of any dramatic composition, designed or suited for public repre-
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sentation, shall be deemed and taken to confer upon the said
author or proprietor, his heirs and assigns, along with the sole
right to print and publish the said composition, the sole right also
to act, perform, or represent the same, or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented, on any stage or public place during the
whole period for which the copyright is obtained."
The bill alleges that the plaintiff's play was designed and suited
for public representation; that it was represented for the first
time on the 12th of August 1867, under his direction, and for his
benefit, at the New York Theatre, a public place of theatrical
amusement in New York, and was thenceforward represented there
for eight consecutive weeks; that it met with great success,
attracted crowds of persons, and was pecuniarily profitable to the
plaintiff to a large amount; that the particular cause of such suecess was what was commonly called, after such public performance,
the "railroad scene" at the end of the third scene of the fourth
act, in which, one of the characters is represented as secured .by
another, and laid helpless upon the rails of a railroad track in such
manner, and with the presumed intent, that the railroad train,
momentarily expected, shall run him down and kill him, and just
at the moment when such a fate seems inevitable another of the
characters contrives to reach the intended -victim, and to drag him
from the track as the train rushes in and passes over the spot;
that this incident and scene was entirely novel and unlike any
dramatic incident known to have been theretofore represented on
any stage, or invented by any author, before the plaintiff so composed, produced, and represented thQ same; that the playing of
said composition and scene caused the same to become famous in
all parts of the United States and Canada and in England; that
the chief value of the composition and its popularity depend upon
said "1railroad scene ;" that it was repeatedly produced and represented by and for the advantage of the plaintiff in many cities and
towns of the United States and Canada, to the profit of the plaintiff; that before learning of the alleged wrongs mentioned in the
bill attempted by the defendants, the plaintiff had made arrangements for representing the play dramatically at New York and in
various places in the United States during the present winter and
the approaching spring; that he accordingly commenced to represent the play at the New York Theatre, in the city of New York,
on the 4th of November, 1868; that soon after the production,
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representation, and printing of the play in the United States, one
Dion Boucicault, a dramatic author and actor and theatrical
manager, a subject of Great Britain, residing in England, procured
a copy of said play by some means, and, without the knowledge
or consent of the plaintiff, prepared therefrom a play, which he
called "After Dark," in which play he introduced several of the
scenes and incidents of the plaintiff's play, varying them slightly,
but following in them the invention and plan of the plaintiff's play,
in a manner which was intended to differ from it only slightly, so
as colorably to be a different work, while substantially retaining
the attractive features of the plaintiff's play, and which contained,
with only colorable variations, the said "1railroad scene" of the
plaintiff's play, substituting for the surface railroad an underground railroad, for the rescuer of the victim to be killed on the
railroad a man for a woman, for the railroad station in which the
rescuer was confined a cellar, and for the breaking down a door
to escape and rescue the victim, the breaking down a wall or the
door in a wall; that the work of Boucicault is a palpable imitation
of the plaintiff's said "railroad scene," and is plagiarized therefrom and put into the play called "After Dark," by Boucicault.
for the purpose of obtaining the pecuniary benefit which might
otherwise result to the plaintiff from the representation of his
play; that the play of "After Dark" was performed in England
without the plaintiff's consent, to the great profit of Boucicault,
and was indebted for its success and profit to such imitation of
said "railroad scene ;" that Boucicault has sent copies of his play
containing such plagiarism of said "railroad scene" to the defendants in the United States, for sale and performance for his own
profit, and several copies of it are in the defendants' possession;
that the defendants are intending, and have announced their purpose, to perform such play called "After Dark" publicly on the
stage, at Niblo's Garden, in New York, on the 16th of November
1868,. and every night thereafter till further notice, without the
consent of the plaintiff; that such play and the 'Plagiarism of said
"railroad scene" are being rehearsed at Niblo's Garden, under
the direction of the defendants, with a view to such public performance thereof; and that the defendant Palmer, acting for
Boucicault, is about to sell copies of the play called "After Dark,"
with said plagiarized scene, to other persons in the United States,
to be publicly represented. The bill prays for an injunction to
VoL.. XVII.-19

DALY v. PALER.

restrain the defendants from the public representation, and from
the sale for dramatic representation of the said " railroad scene"
in "After Dark."
The defence to the applicationon the facts is confined to showing by affidavits that the following matters were known prior to
the taking out by the plaintiff of his copyright, namely, the representation on a stage of a train of cars drawn by a locomotive
engine on a railroad; a like representation, wherein the train
appeared to ran over a man lying on the track; and a like representation, wherein the train appeared to run over a man lying on
the track, who had been thrown thereon in a helpless'condition
by another of the characters, in order that he might be run over
and killed. A story called "1Captain Tom's Fright," in the
Galaxy for March 15th 1867, is also adduced to affect the validity
of the plaintiff's copyright. There is no answer to the bill, nor
is there any denial of the allegations that Boucicault procured a
copy of the plaintiff's play and prepared therefrom the "railroad
scene" in the play of "After Dark," and intended that the latter
should only be colorably different from the "railroad scene" in
the plaintiff's play, by making the substitutions before mentioned,
and that the "1railroad scene" in the play of " After Dark" was
plagiarized by Boucicault from the " railroad scene" in the plaintiff's play.
. In the plaintiff's play there is a surface railroad, with a railroad
station and a signal station shed or store-room. A signal-man
appears, and a.woman named Laura. At the request of Laura,
the signal-man locks her in the shed. There are some axes in it.
One Snorkey then appears. The signal-man then goes off. One
Byke then enters with a coil of rope in his hand, and throws it
over Snorkey, and tightens it around his arm, and coils it around
his legs, and then lays him across the track and fastens him to the
rails, and goes off, having by language given it to be understood
that the intention is that Snorkey shall be run over by the train
and killed. Laura, from a window in the shied, sees what is done.
The steam, whistle of the train is heard. She takes an axe and
strikes the door. The whistle is heard again, with the rumble of
the approaching train. She gives more blows on the door with
the axe. It opens. She runs and unfastens Snorkey. The lights
of the engine appear, and she moves Snorkey's head from the
track as the train rushes past. This incident occupies the whole
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of the third scene of the fourth act. There is a good deal of conversation, first between the signal-man and Laura, and then
between Snorkey and the signal-man, and then between Byke and
Snorkey, and then between Laura and Snorkey. There are stage
directions for Laura to go into the shed; for the signal-man to
lock her in; for Snorkey to enter; for the signal-man to go off;
for Byke to enter with the coil of rope; for Byke to throw the
coil over Snorkey, and tighten the rope around Snorkey's arm,
and coil it around his legs; for Byke to lay Snorkey across the
track, and fasten him to the rails; for Byke to go off; for the
steam whistle to be heard; for blows on the door to be heard; for
the steam whistle to be heard again, with the rumble of the train;
for more blows on the door to be heard; for the door to open;
for Laura to appear with the axe in her hand; for her to run and
unfasten Snorkey; for the lights of the engine to be seen; for
Laura to take Snorkey's head from the track; and for the train
to rush past. These stage directions are separate and apart from
the conversation, and are in italics, and in parentheses, at the
appropriate places in the progress of the scene. The substance
and purport of the successive conversations in the scene are, that
Laura requests the signal-man to lock her in the shed and he consents; that Snorkey requests the signal-man to stop by signal the
expected train and he refuses; that Byke gives Snorkey to understand that he is to be run over and killed by the train; and that
Snorkey requests Laura to break down the door and release him.
The idea is also conveyed by the language in the scene, that Byke
is about to commit robbery and murder at Laura's house, and that
Snorkey is trying to give information of the fact.
In the play of "After Dark" the "railroad scene" is in the
third act. In the first scene of that act one Gordon Chumley is
rendered insensible by drugs, and one Old Tom is thrown by force
into a wine vault. In the second scene of that act Old Tom is
represented as in the vault. There is an orifice in the vault which
opens upon the track of an underground railroad. The rumbling of cars is heard, and lights flash through the orifice. Old
Tom, through a door into an adjoining vault, sees two of the
characters carry Chumley and break a hole through a wall and
pass the body of Chumley through the hole, as he supposes, for
concealment in a well or vault. Old Tom then finds an iron bar,
and resolves to attempt escape by enlarging the orifice in the wall
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opening on the railroad. Then follows scene third. The railroad
is seen, with a circular orifice which ventilates the cellar in which
Old Tom is. The body of Chumley is seen lying across the rails,
and the arm of Old Tom, and then his head, are passed through
the orifice. For this much of the scene there ar6 only stage directions without spoken words. The following is a verbatim copy of
the rest of the scene, the parts in parentheses being stage directions:
"Old Tom.-About four courses of bricks will leave me room
to pass. What is that on the line? There is something surely
there. (A distant telegraph alarm rings, the semaphore levers
play, and the lamps revolve.) Great Heaven! 'tis Gordon. I
see his pale, upturned face-he lives! Gordon! Gordon! I'm
here! He does not answer me. (A whistle is heard and distant
train passes.) Ah! murderers. I see their plan. They have
dragged his insensible body to that place and left him there to be
killed by a passing train. Demons! Wretches! (He works
madly at the orifice. The bricks fall under his blows. The
orifice increases. He tries to struggle through it.) Not yet.
Not yet. (The alarm rings again. The levers in the front play.
The 'red light burns and a white. light is turned to L. H. Tunnel.
The wheels- of an approaching train are heard.) Oh, Heaven!
give me strength-down-down. One moment! (A large piece
of wall falls in and Old Tom comes with it.) See, it comes, the
monster comes. (A loud rumbling and crashing sound is heard.
He tries to move Gordon, but seeing the locomotive close on him,
he flings himself on the body and clasping it in his arms, rolls
over with it forward. A locomotive, followed by a train of carriages, rushes over the place, and as it disappears Old Tom frees
himself from Ohumley and gazes after the train.)" The play of
"After Dark" has never been published by Boucicault, although
printed by him for private use.
The first inquiry is, what is meant in the Act of 1856 by-a

"dramatic composition," what is meant by the 1'public representation" of a dramatic composition, and what is meant by the right
to " act, perform, or represent" a dramatic composition on "a
stage or public place." The Act of 1856 confers on the author or
proprietor of a copyrighted "dramatic composition, designed or
suited for public representation," the sole right of acting, performing, or representing the same on a stage or public place, in
addition to the sole right to print and publish such composition.
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The latter right must be considered as being conferred by the Act
of 1831, for, although that act speaks only of a copyright for a
"book or books, map, chart, musical composition, print, cut, or
engraving," yet, under the language of the Act of 1856, a 11dramatic composition, designed or suited for public representation,"
must be regarded as embraced within the Act of 1831.
A composition in the sense in -which that word is used in the
Act of 1856, is a written or literary work invented and set in
order. A dramatic composition is such a work in which the narrative is not related, but is represented by dialogue and action.
When a dramatic composition is represented, in dialogue and
action, by persons who represent it as real, by performing or going
through with the various parts or characters assigned to them severally, the composition is acted, performed, or represented; and
if the representation is in public, it is a public representation. To
act, in the sense of the statute, is to represent as real, by countenance, voice, or gesture, that which is not real. A character in
a play who goes through with a series of events on the stage without speaking, if such be his part in the play, is none the less an
actor in-it than one who, in addition to motions and gestures, uses
his voice. A pantomime is a species of theatrical entertainment
in which the whole action is represented by gesticulation without
the use of words. A written work consisting wholly of directions
set in order for conveying the ideas of the authbr on a stage or
public place by means of characters who represent the narrative
wholly by action, is as much a dramatic composition designed or
suited for public representation -as if language or dialogue were
used in it to convey some of the ideas.
The "railroad scene" in the plaintiff's play is undoubtedly a
dramatic composition. Those parts of it represented by motion
or gesture, without language, are quite as much a dramatic composition as those parts of it which are represented by voice. This
is true also of the "railroad scene" in "After Dark." Indeed,
on an analysis of the two scenes in the two plays, it is manifest
that the most interesting and attractive dramatic effect in each is
produced by what is done by movement and gesture entirely irrespective of anything that is spoken. The important dramatic
effect in both plays is produced by the movements and gestures
which are prescribed and set in order so as to be read, and which
are contained within parentheses. The spoken words in each are
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of but trifling consequence to the progress of the series of events
represented and communicated to the intelligence of the spectator
by those parts of the scene which are directed to be represented
by movement and gesture., The series of events so represented
and communicated by movement and gesture alone to the intelligence of the spectator, according to the directions contained in
parentheses in the two plays in question here, embraces the confinement of A. in a receptacle from which there seems to be no
feasible means' of egress; a railroad track, with the body of B.
placed across it in such manner as to involve the apparently
certain destruction of his life by a passing train; the appearance
of-A. at an opening in the receptacle, from which A. can see the
body of B.; audible indications that the train is approaching;
successful efforts by A. from within the receptacle, by means of
an implement found within it, to obtain egress from it upon the
track; and the moving of the body of B. by A. from the impending danger, a moment before the train rushes by. In both of the
plays the idea is conveyed that B. is placed intentionally on the
track, with the purpose of having him killed. Such idea is, in
the plaintiff's play, conveyed by the joint medium of language
uttered. and of movements which are the result of prescribed directions, while in Boucicault's play it is conveyed solely by language
uttered. The action, the narrative, the dramatic 'effect and
impression, and the series of events in the two scenes are identical. Both are dramatic compositions designed or suited for public representation. It is true that in one A. is a woman, and in
the other A. is a man; that in one A. is confined in a surface
railroad station-shed, and in the other A. is confined in a cellar
abutting on the track; that in one A. uses an axe, and in the
other A. uses an iron bar; that in one A. breaks down a door,
and in the other A. enlarges a circular hole; that in one B. is
conscious and is fastened to the rails by a rope, and in the other
B. is insensible and is not fastened; and that in one there is a
good deal of dialogue during the scene, and in the other only a
soliloquy by A., and no dialogue. But the two scenes are identical in substance, as written dramatic compositions, in the particulars in which the plaintiff alleges that what he has invented and
set in order in the scene has been appropriated by Boucicault.
Nor is this a case of first impression. An arrangement of
musical notes, forming a tune or air, is a musical composition, and
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the author who has invented it and set it in order and copyrighted
it, is entitled to protection. The extent of that protection has
been the subject of judicial interpretation. In the case of D'Almaine v. Boosey, 1 Younge & Collyer's Exch. R. 288, the plaintiffs, proprietors of the copyright of an opera of Auber's, and also
of another copyright of the overture of the same opera, and also
of another copyright of the airs of the same opera, filed a bill ii
equity to restrain the defendant from infringing such copyrights.
The defendant had published several of the airs, with some alterations, in the shape of quadrilles and waltzes. It was claimed on
the part of the defendant that his work was merely an adaptation
of the original, and therefore not a piracy. But the court (Lord
Chief Baron LYNDHURST) held that if the defendant had published the original air, though with adaptations and harmonies, or
for different instruments, it was a piracy, and that it was not like
the case of an abridgment of a book, where the purpose of the
abridgment was distinct from that of the work from which it was
taken. On this subject the court says: "It is admitted that the
defendant has published portions of the opera containing the
melodious parts of it; that he has also published entire airs; and
that in one of his waltzes he has introduced seventeen bars in
succession, containing the whole of the original air, although he
adds fifteen other bars which are not to be found in it. Now, it
is said that this is not a piracy-first, because the whole of each
air has not been taken; and, secondly, because what the plaintiffs
purchased was the entire opera, and the opera consists not merely of
certain airs and melodies, but of the whole score. But, in the first
place, piracy may be of part of an air as well as of the whole; and,
in the second place, admitting thiat the opera consists of the whole
score, yet if the plaintiffs were entitled to the whole, a fortiori,
they were entitled to publish the melodies which form a part.
Again, it is said that the present publication is adapted for dancing
only, and that some degree of art is needed for the purpose of so
adapting it, and that but a small part of the merit belongs to the
original composer. That is a nice question. It is a nice question
what shall be deemed such a modification of an original work as
shall absorb the merit of the original in the new composition. No
doubt such a modification may be allowed in some cases, as in that
of an abridgment or a digest. Such publications are in their
nature original. Their compiler intends to make of them a new
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use; not that which the author proposed to make. Digests are
of great use to practical men, though not so, comparatively speaking, to students. The same may be said of an abridgment of any
study; but it must be a bond fide abridgment, because if it contains many chapters of the original work, or such as made that
work most saleable, the maker of the abridgment commits a
piracy. Now it will be said that one author may treat the subject very differently from another who wrote before him. That
observation is true in many cases. A man may write upon morals
in a manner quite distinct from that of others who preceded him;
but the subject of music is to be regarded upon very different
principles. It is the air or melody which is the invention of the
author, and which may, in such case, be the subject of piracy;
and you commit a piracy if, by taking not a single bar but several,
you incorporate in the new work that in which the whole meritorious part of the invention consists. * * Now it appears to me
that if you take from the composition of an author all those bars
consecutively which form the entire air or melody without any
material alteration, it is a piracy; though, on the other hand, you
might take them in a different order, or broken by the intersection of others, like words, in such a manner as should not be a
piracy. It must depend on whether the air taken is substantially
the same with the original. Now the most unlettered in music
can distinguish one song from another, and the mere adaptation
of the air, either by changing it to a dance or by transferring it
from one instrument to another, does not, even to common apprehensions, alter the original subject. The ear tells you that it is
the same. The original air requires the aid of genius for its construction, but a mere mechanic in music can make the adaptation
or accompaniment. Substantially the piracy is, where the appropriated music, though adapted to a different purpose from that of
the .original, may still be recognised by the ear. The adding
variations makes no difference in the principle." An injunction
was granted. The views of Lord LYiDHURST in that case were
cited and approved by Mr. Justice NELSON in this court in the
case of Jollie v. Jaques, 1 Blatchf. 0. 0. R. 618, 625. They are
eminently sound and just, and are applicable to the case of a dramatic composition designed for public representation. Such a
composition, when represented, excites emotions and imparts
impressions not merely through the medium of the ear, as music
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does, but through the medium of the eye as well as the ear. 'Movement, gesture and facial expression, which address the eye only, are
as much a part of the dramatic composition as is the spoken language, which addresses the ear only; and that part of the written
composition which gives direction for the movement and gesture is
as much a part of the composition, and protected by the copyright,
as is the language prescribed to be uttered by the characters.
And this is entirely irrespective of the set of the stage, or of the
machinery or mechanical appliances, or of what is called in the
language of the stage, scenery, or the work of the scene painter.
Now, in consonance with the principles laid down by Lord
LYNDHURST, the plaintiff is as much entitled to protection in
respect to a substantial and material original part of his "railroad
scene," as he is in respect to the whole. Under the Act of 1856
construed in connection with the Act of 1831, he is entitled to be
protected against piracy in whole or in part, by representation as
well as by printing, publishing and vending. Although the Act
of 1831, in regard to printing, publishing, and vending, uses the
words "in whole or in part," and the Act of 1856, in regard to
representing, does not use those words, yet the Act of 1856, by
referring, as it does, to the right conferred by the Act of 1831,
as the "sole right to print and publish" the copyrighted composition, when such right is, on the face of the Act of 1831, the sole
right to print and publish "in whole or in part," and by then
conferring "the sole right also to act, perform, or represent the
same, or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented on any
stage or public place," must be held to confer the right to represent in whole or in part. All that is substantial and material in
the plaintiff's "railroad scene," has been used by Boucicault, in
the same order and sequence of events, and in a manner to convey
the same sensations and impressions to those who see it represented, as in the plaintiff's play. Boucicault has indeed adapted
the plaintiff's series of events to the story of his. play, and in doing
so has evinced skill and art, but the same use is made in both
plays of the same series of events, to excite, by representation,
the same emotions in the same sequence. There is no new use,
in the sense of the law, in Boucicault's play, of what is found in
the plaintiff's "railroad scene." The "railroad scene" in Boucicault's play contains everything which makes the "railroad scene"
in the plaintiff's play attractive as a representation on the stage.
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As, in the case of the musical composition, the air is the invention
of the author, and a piracy is committed if that in which the whole
meritorious part of the invention consists is incorporated in another
work, without any material alteration in sequence of bars, so in
the case of the dramatic composition, designed or suited for representation, the series of events directed in writing by the author
in any particular scene is his invention, and a piracy is committed
if that in which the whole merit of the scene consists is incorporated in anbther work without any material alteration in the
constituent parts of the series of events, or in the sequence of the
events in the series. The adaptation of such series of events to
different characters who use different language from the charactets
and language in the first play, is like the adaptation of the musical
air to a different instrument, or the addition to it of variations or
of an accompaniment. The original subject of invention, that
which required genius to construct it and set it in order, remains
the same in the adaptation. A mere mechanic in dramatic composition can make such adaptation; and it is a piracy if the appropriated series of events, when represented on the stage, although
performed by new and different characters using different language,
is recognised by the spectator through any of the senses to which
the representation is addressed, as conveying substantially the
same impressions to, and exciting the same emotions in the mind,
in the same sequence or order. Tested by these principles, the
"railroad scene" in Boucicault's play is undoubtedly, when acted,
performed, or represented on a stage or public place, an invasion
and infringement of the copyright of the plaintiff in the "railroad
scene" in his play.
The substantial identity between the two scenes would naturally
lead to the conclusion that the later one had been adopted from
the earlier one. The charge of actual plagiarism on the part of
Boucicault made in the bill is not denied. It is hardly possible
that the resemblances are accidental, and that the differences are
not merely colorable, with a view to disguise the plagiarism. The
true test as to whether there is piracy or not is to ascertain
whether there is a servile or evasive imitation of the plaintiff's
work, or whether there is a bond fide original compilation made
up from common materials and common sources, with resemblances
which are merely accidental, or result from the nature of the subject: Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story 768, 793.
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Nothing that has been adduced on the part of the defendants
affects the validity of the plaintiff's copyright, on the question of
the originality and novelty of the "railroad scene" in his play.
The sale of Boucicault's play to other persons, with a view to
its public representation, makes the seller a participant in causing
the play to be publicly represented.
An injunction must, therefore, issue restraining the defendants
from the public performance or representation, and from the sale
for public performance or representation, of the "railroad scene"
in the play of "After Dark," or of any scene in substance the
same as the "railroad scene" in either of the two plays, as such
scene is herein defined.

Court of Chancery of Delaware.
WHARTON

ET

AL. v. CLEMENTS ET AL.

A partner with the knowledge of his copartner converted to the use of the firm
money received by him as a United States deputy collector of internal revenue.
Held, that a bond of the firm given to indemnify the sureties of the deputy collector
was valid as a partnership obligation.
Such bond valid as an indemnity although executed before the sureties had made
good the defalcation, and although in form it was a bond for the payment of
money.

THE material facts in this case were these :-John F. Clements,
a United States deputy collector" of internal revenue, converted
the public revenue collected by him to the use of the firm of J. F.
Clements & Co., of which he was a member. This was done with
the*knowledge and concurrence of his copartner. The firm becoming insolvent, Clements and his copartner executed their joint
obligation to indemnify the defendants as sureties in Clements's
official bond. The obligation so given was an -absolute bond for
the payment of $500, with a warrant of attorney for the confession
of judgment annexed. Judgment was confessed upon the bond
and execution issued, under -which the partnership goods were
levied upon and sold. The complainants, certain simple-contract
creditors of the firm, then filed this bill to restrain, the sheriff from
paying to the sureties the proceeds of their execution, praying
that the fund might be held in order to meet their claims when

WHARTON v. CLEMENTS.

prosecuted to judgment. They had since obtained judgments for
their respective claims.
At the time of the execution of the indemnifying bond the sureties of Clements had sustained no damage, but since the goods
were sold under their execution, and in fact since this bill was
filed, they had under legal process made good to the United
States collector Clements's defalcation to an amount exceeding the
fund in the sheriff's hands. Whether they were entitled to take
the proceeds of their execution, or whether these proceeds should
be held applicable to the judgments of the complainants as creditors of the firm, was the question in controversy.
E. S. Reed, for the complainants.
J. Alexander Fulton, for the defendants.
BATEs, Chancellor.-This bill contests the validity of a judgment confessed by the firm of J. F. Clements & Co., to indemnify
the defendants, who were sureties of Clements as deputy collector
of internal revenue, against such loss as might accrue to them
from his conversion of the public revenue to the use of the firm.
The objection taken in argument is that the judgment was without
consideration to the firm of J. F. Clements & Co., and was void
as against the partnership creditors. That it was without consideration has been urged on the ground that the firm did not, by
receiving and using the money collected by Clements and for the
due application of which the sureties were bound, incur any partnership debt or liability to the sureties, forming a consideration
for the bond; that, on the contrary, the firm as it received the
money from Clements became debtor to him alone; that the only
remedy of the sureties was against Clements; that between the
firm and the sureties there was no privity.
The fallacy of this objection lies in its assuming that the public revenue converted to the use of the partnership was the money
of Clements; as if he had borrowed a sum of money on is own
credit and put it into the business; in which case, unquestionably,
the -firm would have been indebted to him only, and not to the
person from whom he borrowed. So, if the collection of the public revenue were farmed out to a collector, who, paying to the
Government a stipulated sum, should become entitled to collect tlhe
taxes for his reimbursement; in such case, the taxes when col-
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lected would be his own property, and if put into the business of a
partnership of which he might be a member, would create no liability on the part of the firm except to himself. But in the present case, the money used by J. F. Clements & Co. was in
Clements's hands, as the mere agent of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, whose money it was, that is, as between the collector and
Clements, though ultimately it was payable to the United States
Government. It was a trust fund. Now it is a rule, that the
rights of a cestui que trust adhere to the trust property or fund,
and follow it, into whosesoever hands it .may come, except those
of a bond fide purchaser for value and without notice. It was
forcibly said by Lord ELLENBOROUGH, that "an abuse of trust
can confer no rights on the party abusing it, nor on those who
claim in privity with him :" 3 M. & S. 574. If the subject-matter
of the trust be lands or chattels, such as can be identified, they
may be followed and recovered in specie; if it be money, that is,
converted by the trustee, whoever receives it with knowledge of
the trust, or without a valuable consideration, becomes a debtor to
the eestui que trust. Or, if the money has been used in the purchase of property, say of lands, the cestui que trust may at his
election either take the property (2 Dyer 160, 1 Amb. 409), or he
may follow the money into the hands of the vendor, holding the
vendor as his debtor. This is a settled rule, founded upon the
most obvious necessity, that of preventing the .facilities there
would otherwise be given for the fraudulent conversion of trust
property. The rule is enforced at law whenever the circumstances
raise a legal cause of action. In courts of equity, relief is given
universally. It is one of the varibus applications of the equitable
doctrine of implied trusts: See at large 2 Story's Eq. Jur.,
§§ 1257-8; Lewin on Trusts (201-2), 24 Law Lib.; Oliver v.
Pratt, 8 How. S. C. Rep. 338.
Among the cases to which this
rule has been applied, there are some in which the party receiving
trust-money, knowing it to be such, has been held liable as a
debtor directly to the cestui que trust. Some of these may be
noticed.
In Smith v. Jameson, 5 T. R. 601, Robert Jameson, while a
partner in business with Thomas Jameson, was also one of the
assignees in bankruptcy of Lewis and Potter. As assignee of the
bankrupt he received 25631., which he brought into his partnership with the privity of his partner Thomas Jameson. The part-
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nership was dissolved, and all its effects and credits assigned to
Robert, he assuming the debts. After this a commission of bankruptcy issued against Robert and Thomas Jameson, and Robert
was removed as one of the assignees of Lewis & Potter. His coassignees then claimed to prove the 25631. against the estate of
Robert and Thomas Jameson under the commission of bankruptcy
against them. The Lord Chancellor directed this action at law
to try the question whether the assignees of Lewis & Potter could
maintain an action against the partnership of Robert and Thomas
Jameson for the sums received by Robert as assignee of Lewis &
Potter's estate, and appropriated by him to his own partnership.
It.was admitted that the partners by receiving the money became
indebted to the estate of Lewis J. Potter, but insisted that the
assignment of the partnership effects by Thomas Jameson to
Robert, while the latter continued to be an. assignee of Lewis &
Potter, was a discharge. This objection the court overruled, and
the assignee recovered.
In Stone v. Harsh, 13 Eng. Com. Law 249, one of several
trustees of stock under a will, by means of a forged power of
attorney sold the stock, and the proceeds were carried into the
business of a firm of which he was a partner. Upon an issue out
of Chancery to inquire whether the partnership which received
the money was indebted for it to the trustees, it was so held by
Lord TENTERDEN, who also seems to have considered it inimaterial
whether or not the other partners were ignorant of the fraud.
'In Hutcinson v. Smith, 7 Paige 26, one Smith, the treasurer
of Monroe county, commencing business in January 1827, used
money in his hands as county treasuier in the purchase of a stock
of goods. Soon afterwards he took into partnership with him
Phelps, whose interest in the stock and business it was agreed
should be estimated from January. Phelps entered the firm,
knowing that the county funds had been put into the business.
In July Smith died. The firm was then, as it was afterwards
ascertained, insolvent. Phelps, the surviving partner, assigned
all the partnership property to a creditor for the payment of the
debts, preferring some; and among other preferred debts was the
obligation to the county, which was included at the instance of
the sureties on the treasurer's bond. The funds assigned proving
insufficient to pay all the debts of the firm, the non-preferred creditors filed their bill to set aside the assignment, and, among
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other grounds, objected that the debt due to the county was the
private debt of Smith, for which the partnership was not liable.
But the Vice-Chancellor, and on appeal the Chancellor, held it to
be a partnership debt, and properly provided for by the assignment.
In Bichardson v. French, 4 Mete. 577, the same principle was
applied to the case of a partnership, into which one of the partners, being also an administrator, brought funds from the estate
of his intestate. See further, Collyer on Partn., § 391, and cases
cited.
. We see, then, that the firm of J. F. Clements & Co., by using,
with the knowledge of both partners, the funds held by Clements
as deputy collector, became debtors to the United States collector.
A bond of the firm securing 'the money to him would have been
unquestionably valid as a partnership obligation. Next, we inquire
how stood the sureties ? Did there arise out of this transaction
any liability on the part of the firm to' them, forming a sufficient
consideration for this judgment? Now, had the sureties before
taking the judgment (as they have since done), made good to the
United States collector Clements's defalcation, they would have
succeeded in equity to the exact position of the collector before
stated as a creditor of the firm. In equity, sureties, upon payment of the debt or performance of the duty of their principal,
are subrogated to all rights, securities, and remedies of the creditor as means of indemnifying themselves, except only that
under the English decisions, sureties paying the debt cannot take
an assignment of the instrument upon which they are bound;
which right, however, is conceded to them under the American
decisions, and in this state it is given by statute: Rev. Code, chap.
65. But when this judgment was confessed the sureties had paid
nothing, and whether, in fact, they would sustain any loss was
contingent until the collector should elect to take his remedy
against them rather than against Clements or the firm. Could
they in that position take a bond of indemnity? And, if any,
could they take an absolute bond for the payment of money, such
as the bond upon which this judgment was confessed? There can
be no doubt on these points. By force of the defalcation alone
and before any payment was made by the sureties, their liability to
pay became fixed, although whether this liability would be enforced
might for a time remain uncertain. So. also the firm of J. F.
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Clements & Co., by the very act of converting to its own use the
trust funds for which the sureties were bound, incurred a liability
directly to the sureties; a liability, first, to answer to them in the
event of their loss, according to the equitable doctrine of subrogation, in the same manner and to the same extent in which they
stood responsible to the collector; and, second (as it seems to be
now settled), even before any loss had accrued to the sureties, the
fiW might have been brought into a court of equity and compelled
to exonerate the sureties by paying the debt: 1 Story Eq. Jur.,
§§ 827, 639, 730; Lord Chancellor in Nesbit v. Smith, 2 Bro. C.
C. [582] and note (a); Cox v. Tyson, 1 Turn. & Russ. 895; Hays
v..Ward, 4 Johns. Oh. 132; 1 Lead. Cas. in Eq. 87.
Such is the right of a surety as against his principal. The
same right these sureties had against J. F. Clements & Co.,
because the firm, as well as Clements individually, were bound to
exonerate the sureties. Thus the firm were, by the very act of
using this money, brought under an obligation to indemnify the
sureties; not only to make good in the future such loss as might
in the event be sustained, but to exonerate the sureties, if so
required, at once. Clearly then it was both their right and duty
promptly to indemnify the sureties. In what form, we next inquire, might this be done? Might it be by an absolute bond for
the payment of a sum of money estimated as sufficient to cover
the loss ? This was controverted in the argument. But the validity of a money bond as a mode of indemnifying sureties has been
affirmed by the Court of Errors and Appeals in Temnell v. Jefferson, 5 Harring. 206. There a judament-bond for $15,000 had
been given by Temnell to certain trustees in trust to apply the
proceeds towards indemnifying the sureties of Temnell as administrator of Miers Burton, deceased, and as guardian of his children.
The Chancellor (JoHNs) sustained the precise objection here made,
that sureties, before actual payment of the debt for which they
are bound, cannot take as an indemnity an a bsolute bond for the
payment of money, but only a bond with a collateral condition to
indemnify them, upon which judgment might be entered by virtue
of a warrant of attorney so as to effect a lien on real estate, but
without the power to take execution until the damages should be
ascertained through a'verdict or an inquisition upon breaches of
condition assigned. The Court of Errors and Appeals held the
contrary, sustaining the right of the surety to take for his indem-

